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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT QF ISSUES AND

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Commonwealth did not breach the terms oj the insurant ? / • :;i lie) h) • not
defending Chapmans' title against the County's claim:.
Whether the trial court was correct in determining that Commonwealth had not breached
the insurance contract by refusing to defend the Chapmans against Uintah County's claim is a
question of law that this Court reviews for correctness. Holmes Development, L L C i > C< >< )k ; 4 8
IV/StJK^lM (Utah limi).
ISSUE 2

I hapmans never raised any cause of action in the trial court for
compensation resulting from the defect in their title.

A litigant who fails to raise a claim in the trial court waives his right to raise that claim
on appeal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Malibu Investment Co. v Sparks, 996
I 2:< 1 10 13, 10521f3 1 ( I Jti th 2000).
ISSUE 3 -

Chapmans never raised an issue of arbitration in the trial court.

riiis Court will not consider issues which were not submitted to the trial court and
concerning which the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact or

ISSUE 4 -

Commonwealth and Basin are not liable in tort to Chapmans, but are
only responsible to compensate them for the loss occasioned by the
defect in their title

1

The trial court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed for correctness and affirmed
if the undisputed material facts demonstrate that the successful litigant's position is correct as
a matter of law. Fashion Place Investment, Ltd v. Salt Lake County, 776 P.2d 941, 943 (Utah
App. 1989).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE.

Nile Chapman and Roger Chapman (hereinafter

collectively "Chapmans") purchased property in Uintah County in 1997. (R475, «j[l). At the
time they purchased the property, they hired Basin to provide title insurance. (R466, ^49).
Some time after they purchased the property, Uintah County informed them that the road that
ran across their property was a public right of way, and asked Chapmans to remove a gate that
they had built across the road. (R38,1ffl9-l0).
Chapmans and their neighbor Gordon Harmston, trustee of the Eugene Harmston Trust
(collectively "Plaintiffs") sued Uintah County for a declaration that the road was a private road,
and Uintah County counterclaimed for a declaration that it was a public road. (R21 -3; R96-90).
Approximately five months into the litigation, Chapmans added Commonwealth as a defendant.
(R168-143). Commonwealth had issued a title insurance policy to Chapmans in 1997 through
its local agent, Basin. In a Second Amended Complaint against both Commonwealth and Basin,
filed almost a year after the litigation commenced, Chapmans asserted that Commonwealth had
breached its contract of title insurance by refusing to defend Chapmans against Uintah County's
claim that the road was public. (R466-465). Chapmans further asserted tort claims against

2

Basin on the allegation that it should have discovered and disclosed to the Chapmans the
documents on which Uintah County based its claim that the road was public •. (R 465 -462) I lie
l liiipiiiiims i Liiiiin! Ihil i 'nmmomuMllh i v h » u JImush habit1 Un H.IMH'

lull

(

I lhf In "I

Under paragraphs 6 and 7 the policy, Commonwealth has the option to pay the
Chapmans' loss measured by the diminution in value of the property resulting from the title
defect. 'UdlM^I'' Jl 1 li«i|>iiiciu.s nv\ ri pk<ul<<l JI i tiusi1 i<l adfnn li'f (li\ lL« »s\ Now Ihckss,
Commonwealth offered 11 > pa\ il lo them. (R600-598). But Chapmans continued to rest on the
allegations of the Second Amended Complaint that Commonwealth's refusal to pay their cost
of defense was a breach of contract. The trial court dismissed this claim on summary judgment
(R806), but in doing so, preserved their right to plead their loss

in dismissing the breach of

dismissal was without prejudice to their right to recover for their loss claim under the policy.
(R806, fnl). Thereafter, the Chapmans did not amend their complaint to bring a claim against
Commonwealth for their loss. Instead, the issues in the case between plaintiffs and Uintah
Coi u it) w ent to trial 1:I

The trial court also dismissed the Chapmans' tort claims on summary judgment because,
under Utah law, neither Basin nor Commonwealth had a duty to Chapmans to act as abstractors
c >f title. (R806-805).

1

In the interim, the Chapmans and Commonwealth could not come to agreement on the
amount of Chapman's loss, and Commonwealth filed a petition with the American
Arbitration Association in May 2001 to resolve that issue. The arbitration is still pending.
3

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: Chapmans brought suit against Uintah County,
seeking a determination that a road across their property was a private, not a public road. (R21 1). Uintah County counterclaimed, asserting that the road was a public county road. (R96-90).
Five months later, Chapmans amended their Complaint to bring in Commonwealth Land
Title Insurance Company ("Commonwealth") as a defendant (R168-141). A year after the
initial complaint, Chapmans filed their Second Amended Complaint, and added Basin Land
Title and Abstract, Inc. ("Basin") as a defendant. (R476-443). The Fifth through Eighth Claims
for Relief in the Second Amended Complaint were directed against Commonwealth and Basin
(R466-462). The trial court dismissed each of these causes of action on summary judgment.
(R808-804).
The trial court then scheduled trial of the dispute between Chapmans and Uintah County.
The jury found that the road was a public road because it had been used continuously by the
public for more than ten years. (R1802, Rl 119, R 1154 at 378). The trial court entered its
Order of Judgment on September 28, 2001. (Rl 143-1145).
This appeal followed. (Rl 148-1149).
STATEMENT OF FACTS. The following facts were undisputed for purposes of the
trial court's summary judgment ruling (and correspond with the facts as recited on summary
judgment):
1.

Nile Chapman hired Basin to provide title insurance for his purchase of the

Fredrickson property which took place in August 1997. (R635, R750).

4

2.

At the time Nile Chapman hired Basin, he did not provide any instructions to

investigate the road that ran through the Fredrickson propertj (R 635, R 7:50),
3.

Additi< *

de Basin i vitl i. ail) w i: itten escrow instructions or

additional instructions of any sort. (R634, R750).
4.

Basin provided Nile Chapman a Commitment for Title Insurance through

Commonwealth prior to closing on the Fredrickson property. (R634, R750).
5.

Tin i oniiiiiihiiu nil "I'I illi n I'linl I Iln mad h',hl:

Schedule B of the policy or policies to be issued will contain exceptions to the
following matters unless the same are disposed of to the satisfaction of the
company:... 18. Property is not located on a comlty road and company DOES
NOT INSURE ACCESS.
(R634,R 750, R 613 R 611)
6.

OMITTED on this appeal as dispi ited

7.

Although Nile Chapman spoke with Ruth Ann Green at Basin about two other

issues after he received the Commitment, he never asked her about the status of the road. (R634,
R750).

them that the road that ran across the property was a public right of way and asked the
Chapmans to remove a gate they had built across the road. (R634, R750).
9.

When the title insurance policy was issued, it read:
1

1 his policy does not insure against loss or damage (and the Company will
not pay costs, attorney's fees or expenses) which arise by reason of: . , .

5

18. Property is not located on a county road and company DOES NOT
INSURE ACCESS.
(R634-633; R759, R444-443a).
10.

Another pertinent part of the Policy reads:
In case of a claim under this policy, the Company shall have the following
additional options:
. . . (B) To Pay or Otherwise Settle . . . With the Insured Claimant
. . . (ii) to pay or otherwise settle with the insured claimant the loss
or damage provided for under this policy, together with any costs,
attorneys' fees and expenses incurred by the insured claimant,
which were authorized by the Company up to the time of payment
and which the Company is obligated to pay.
Upon the exercise of the Company of either of the options provided for in
paragraphs (b)(i) or (ii), the Company's obligations to the insured under
this policy for the claimed loss or damage, other than the payments
required to be made, shall terminate including any liability or obligation
to defend, prosecute, or continue any litigation.

(R633, R749; R603 at |6) (emphasis added).
11.

Commonwealth has elected to pay the loss suffered by the Chapmans, as is its

option under the title insurance policy. (R633; R600-598).
Chapmans purported to dispute this paragraph on summary judgment, but did so without
any foundation or citation to the record. (R749).
12.

Under the title insurance policy, a claimant under the policy must provide

Commonwealth with Proof of Loss or Damage. (R633, R749, R603, f 5).
13.

Under the Policy, all notices, including claims and notices of loss, to

Commonwealth must be sent to its Consumer Affairs Department in Richmond, Virginia.
(R633;R602Tfl7).
6

Chapmans purported to dispute this paragraph on summary judgment, but did so without
any foundation or citation to the record. (R749).
14.

While the Chapmans did write a letter to Basin on March 24, 1999, notifying

Basin of its alleged claim against the title insurance policy issued by Commonwealth on August
11, 1997, they did not provide Proof of Loss to Commonwealth, as required under the policy,
until April 12, 2000. (R632, R749, R596-595, R593-590).
15.

However, Chapmans initiated the lawsuit against Uintah County on April 29,

1999; Commonwealth was added as a defendant in the Amended Complaint filed on June 11,
1999 but was not served until October 29, 1999; and Basin became a defendant in the Second
Amended Complaint filed on March 24, 2000. (R632, R749, R21-3, R168-143, R476-443).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE 1 -

COMMONWEALTH DID NOT BREACH THE TERMS OF THE
INSURANCE POLICY BY NOT DEFENDING CHAPMANS' TITLE
AGAINST THE COUNTY'S CLAIM.

A title insurance policy is a contract between the insured and the insurer, and their rights
under the policy are to be determined under ordinary rules of contract construction. In
accordance with the policy issued by Commonwealth to Chapman, Commonwealth has
alternative rights when presented with an insured claim. Commonwealth may defend against
an adverse claim to title, or Commonwealth may, at its option, pay the loss occasioned by the
defect in title. The policy defines the measure of compensable loss as a diminution in value of
the property resulting from the title defect. (R603^f7). In this case, once it learned of the claim,

7

Commonwealth opted to pay the Chapmans5 loss rather than to defend against Uintah County's
claim that the road which ran across the Chapmans' property was a county road.
Chapmans' breach of contract claim, set out in its Fifth Claim for Relief, asserted that
Commonwealth had breached its duty to defend their title against Uintah County's assertions
of the public nature of the road. But under the contract, Commonwealth has no fixed obligation
or duty to "clear title" for Chapmans. The policy does not guarantee or insure that there will
be no losses. It only creates an obligation on the part of Commonwealth to pay the Chapmans'
loss if it chooses not to proceed with litigation to clear title. Commonwealth made that election
as it was allowed to do under the policy. Thus, the trial court correctly ruled as a matter of law
that Commonwealth had not breached the contract by refusing to defend Chapmans' title.
ISSUE 2-

CHAPMANS NEVER RAISED ANY CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE TRIAL
COURT FOR COMPENSATION RESULTING FROM THE DEFECT IN
THEIR TITLE.

The amount and extent of loss that the Chapmans suffered as a result of the defect in
their title was not an issue in the litigation, because Chapmans never pleaded it. Instead, they
rested on their allegations that Commonwealth had breached the contract by refusing to defend
their title. Commonwealth has acknowledged that it has liability to Chapmans to pay their loss,
and when the trial court dismissed their contract cause of action, the loss claim remained alive.
The trial court specifically left the door open to Chapmans to raise their loss claim if they
wished to dispute it, noting that the dismissal was without prejudice to the Chapmans' rights to
pursue their loss. But Chapmans did not amend their complaint to pursue the loss. Never

8

having been raised below, this is an issue that cannot be challenged on appeal. (The loss claim
is currently the subject of a pending arbitration proceeding that is completely separate from the
litigation).
ISSUE 3 -

CHAPMANS NEVER RAISED AN ISSUE OF ARBITRATION IN THE
TRIAL COURT,

The parties5 arbitration rights under the title policy were never raised as an issue in the
trial court, and thus, are not properly before this Court. Moreover, Chapmans have not
established any facts to satisfy the two-pronged standard necessary to demonstrate waiver of
a contractual right of arbitration - (1) Commonwealth's participation in the litigation was not
inconsistent with its right to arbitrate the Chapmans' loss claim because the loss claim was not
an issue in the trial court; and (2) Chapmans have not offered any claim of prejudice. Finally,
Commonwealth was not required to raise waiver as an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c),
U.R.Civ.P., because the rule only requires a party to raise affirmative defenses to claims that
the plaintiff actually raises.
ISSUE 4 -

COMMONWEALTH AND BASIN ARE NOT LIABLE IN TORT TO
CHAPMANS. BUT ARE ONLY RESPONSIBLE TO COMPENSATE
THEM FOR THE LOSS OCCASIONED BY THE DEFECT IN THEIR
TITLE.

The Utah Supreme Court has squarely held that title insurance agents cannot be liable
to an insured simply because the commitment or policy contains an error in reflecting title. A
title insurer can and does assume the risk of its policy. But when a contingency insured against

9

in a policy occurs, the insurer is not liable in tort. A title insurer is not an abstractor and cannot
be sued for abstractor liability.
Tort liability arises only when the title company assumes duties and responsibilities in
addition to those undertaken in connection with the issuance of a title commitment or policy.
Here, Chapmans hired Basin to provide title insurance. They did not provide any instructions
to investigate the road. They did not provide Basin with any escrow instructions or any written
instructions of any sort. Basin assumed no duties and performed no actions that would give rise
to tort liability. Chapmans selectively pick language from the policy and commitment, and
argue that the words (out of context) show that Basin assumed the duty of an abstractor. Read
in context, the language to which Chapmans point is nothing more than a statement by Basin
that it would not and did not insure that the property had any access to a county road. Under
clear Utah Supreme Court precedent, Basin did nothing that would subject it to tort liability.

ARGUMENT
ISSUE 1 -

COMMONWEALTH DID NOT BREACH THE TERMS OF THE
INSURANCE POLICY BY NOT DEFENDING CHAPMANS9 TITLE
AGAINST THE COUNTY'S CLAIM.

In their Fifth Claim for Relief against Commonwealth, Chapmans asserted that
Commonwealth breached the title insurance contract because it had not defended them against
Uintah County's claim that the road which ran through their property is a county road. (R466465). Whether the trial court was correct in determining that Commonwealth had not breached
the insurance contract by refusing to defend the Chapmans against Uintah County's claim is a

10

question of law that this Court reviews for correctness. Holmes Development, LLC v. Cook, 48
P.3d 895 Tf24 (Utah 2002). A title insurance policy is a contract between the insured and the
insurer, and their rights under the policy are to be determined under ordinary rules of contract
construction. Id.
Commonwealth's obligations to Chapmans upon receipt of a claim are spelled out in the
Conditions and Stipulations to the policy. (R603,ffl[4and 6). In particular, Sections 4 and 6
explain the various courses of action available to Commonwealth upon receipt of an insured
claim. Under Section 4, Commonwealth may defend against insured claims or to prosecute
actions to establish title. The obligation provided by Section 4 to defend title is "subject to the
options contained in Section 6 of these Conditions and Stipulations." (R603, f4). Pursuant to
Section 6, Commonwealth had the option to pay the Chapmans their loss instead of defending
title:
In case of a claim under this policy, the Company shall have the following additional
options:
. . . (b) To Pay or Otherwise Settle . . . With the Insured Claimant
. . . (ii) to pay or otherwise settle with the insured claimant the loss or
damage provided for under this policy, together with any costs, attorneys'
fees and expenses incurred by the insured claimant, which were authorized
by the Company up to the time of payment and which the Company is
obligated to pay.
Upon the exercise of the Company of either of the options provided for in paragraphs
(b)(i) or (ii), the Company's obligations to the insured under this policy for the claimed
loss or damage, other than the payments required to be made, shall terminate including
any liability or obligation to defend, prosecute, or continue any litigation.

11

(R603?l|6) (emphasis added). The clear language of the Conditions and Stipulations gives
Commonwealth the right to choose to proceed with litigation or to pay Chapmans' losses
suffered as a result of the title defect.
It was undisputed below that Commonwealth elected under the policy to pay the
Chapmans' loss rather than to defend the litigation.2 In its March 20,2000 letter to Chapmans'
counsel and again in its September 13,2000 letter (R600-598), Commonwealth acknowledged
coverage for the claim, indicated that it would pay Chapmans for their loss pursuant to sections
6 and 7 of the Conditions and Stipulations. Commonwealth noted that Section 7 of the policy
defines the measure of compensable loss as a diminution in value of the property resulting from
the title defect, and invited Chapmans to prepare and submit a proof of loss.

Id.

Commonwealth indicated that it would promptly tender payment upon receipt of a sufficient
basis to assess the claim. Id. Commonwealth's letters constitute full compliance with its
obligations under the insurance contract.
The Chapmans' breach of contract against Commonwealth, set out in its Fifth Claim for
Relief, asserted that Commonwealth had breached its duty to defend title. The claim reads in
full as follows:
49. On or before July 16,1997, Plaintiffs Chapman applied through Defendant
Basin Title for a policy of title insurance from Defendant Commonwealth covering the
real property forming the subject matter of this action in Sec 31. T8S, R21E.
2

Chapmans never even provided Commonwealth with the opportunity to take up the
defense of Uintah County's claim before suing them for breach of contract. The Chapmans
initiated the litigation on their own, with an attorney they retained without Commonwealth's
input or consent and in violation of #4 of the Conditions and Stipulations.
12

50. On or about July 16, 1997, Commonwealth issued Plaintiffs Chapman its
Title Policy No. 207-899161 ensuring Chapman's title to the real property forming the
subject matter of this action declaring in Section B, Item 18 thereof: "Property is not
located on a county road and company DOES NOT INSURE ACCESS."
51. After notice from Defendant Uintah County regarding the claimed public
right-of-way over Plaintiff s property, Plaintiffs Chapman duly and properly made claim
upon Defendant Commonwealth to defend Plaintiffs Chapman against Uintah County's
claim that Wyasket Bottom Road was a county road.
52. Despite such demand. Defendant Commonwealth failed, refused and
neglected to defend Plaintiffs Chapman's quiet use and enjoyment of the subject real
property, thereby breaching the contract of title insurance issued to Plaintiffs Chapman
by Defendant Commonwealth.
53. As and for their damages, Plaintiffs Chapman claim general and special
damages in an amount to be proven at trial, including, but not limited to attorneys fees
and costs of suit incurred by Plaintiffs Chapman in defending their right to quiet use and
enjoyment of the subject property.
(R466-465) (emphasis added).
In asserting that Commonwealth breached the contract by refusing to defend against
Uintah's claimed public right-of-way, Chapmans asked that Commonwealth be compelled to
do something that the contract did not require. The contract does not purport to "guarantee"
title. Commonwealth has no fixed obligation or duty to "clear title" for Chapmans. The policy
does not guarantee or insure that there will be no losses. It only creates an obligation on the part
of Commonwealth to pay the Chapmans' losses if it chooses not to proceed with litigation to
clear title. Cf., Securities Serv., Inc. v. Transamerica Title, 583 P.2d 1217, 1222 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1978) (analyzing language of title insurance policy and determining that insurance
company had option to pay policy limits or defend to judgment). The policy clearly gives

13

Commonwealth the option to pay Chapmans' loss rather than defend their title. Thus, the trial
court correctly ruled as a matter of law that Commonwealth had not breached the contract by
refusing to defend against Uintah County's claim.
ISSUE 2-

CHAPMANS NEVER RAISED ANY CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE TRIAL
COURT FOR COMPENSATION RESULTING FROM THE DEFECT IN
THEIR TITLE,

Chapmans assert in their brief on appeal that the amount and extent of their loss under
Section 6 of the contract was a disputed issue and that the trial court could not dismiss their
breach of contract claim without resolving that issue in a trial on the merits of their loss. But
their loss claim against Commonwealth was not an issue in the litigation. Instead, the
Chapman's breach of contract claim was that Commonwealth was liable for damages resulting
from its failure to defend Chapmans' title against Uintah County. (R466-465). When the trial
court dismissed their breach of contract claim, the amount and extent of the Chapmans' loss due
to the title defect was not affected - it simply was not an issue before the trial court.
Nor was the issue ever brought to the trial court. Chapmans were not entitled under the
policy to any coverage for their loss until they provided Commonwealth with a Proof of Loss
or Damage. (R603 ^|5). Paragraph 7 of the Conditions and Stipulations defines the measure of
compensable loss as diminution in value. (R603 ^|7). In their April 12, 2000 Proof of Loss,
Chapmans indicated that quantifying diminution in value was difficult, and insisted that
Commonwealth was required to pay their costs of defending their title against Uintah's claim.
(R593-590). Commonwealth responded by noting that the policy did not require it to defend

14

Chapmans' title, and requested Chapmans, if they could not accurately state the loss in terms
of diminution in value, to provide factual information relevant to the diminution in value
assessment so that an appraisal could be ordered. (R600-598). Chapmans continued to insist
that Commonwealth pay to defend their title, and rested on the allegations they had set forth in
their pleadings, i.e., that Commonwealth's refusal to defend title constituted a breach of the
policy.
When the trial court dismissed Commonwealth's breach of contract claim on summary
judgment, it left the door open to Chapmans to raise their loss claim if they wished to dispute
the amount and extent thereof.3 In its order of dismissal, the trial court noted that Chapmans
still had rights under Section 6, and ordered that the dismissal of their breach of contract claim
was without prejudice to pursue their rights under that section. (R806, fill). Commonwealth
has acknowledged liability to Chapmans under that section.4

The Chapmans could have

amended their complaint to assert a dispute against Commonwealth over the amount and extent
of their loss claim. But they did not amend their complaint to further pursue Commonwealth.

3

Note that Chapmans would not have been entitled to raise the loss claim as a defense
to Commonwealth's motion for summary judgment. A plaintiff is not allowed to amend his
complaint by raising unpleaded claims or theories of recovery in opposition to summary
judgment. Holmes Development, LLC v. Cook, 48 P.3d 895, 904 (Utah 2002).
4

Contrary to Chapmans' assertion, acknowledging liability for the loss that Chapmans
suffered as a result of Uintah's County's adverse title claim does not constitute an admission
of liability for breach of contract. The nature and purpose of a title insurance policy is to
indemnify the insured against losses suffered by reason of title defects. Valley Bank & Trust
Co. v. U.S. Life Title Ins.Co. of Dallas, 776 P.2d 933, 935 (Utah App. 1989). Far from
breaching its obligations under the contract, Commonwealth's acknowledgment of liability
under Section 6 constitutes compliance of its obligations under the insurance contract.
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Instead, they proceeded to trial against Uintah County on the merits of their assertions about the
nature of the road and with this appeal. Thus, the loss claim was never an issue in the trial
court.
The loss claim remains a live issue between the Chapmans and Commonwealth. It is the
currently the subject of a pending arbitration proceeding that is completely separate from the
litigation and that has nothing to do with this proceeding on appeal. But it was not an issue in
the trial court, and thus, it is not an issue that can be challenged in this appeal. See, Malibu
Investment Co. v. Sparks, 996 P.2d 1043,10521}34 (Utah 2000) (litigant who fails to raise claim
in trial court waives right to raise claim on appeal of trial court's grant of summary judgment).
ISSUE 3 -

CHAPMANS NEVER RAISED AN ISSUE OF ARBITRATION IN THE
TRIAL COURT.

Nor were the parties' rights to arbitration under the title policy raised as an issue in the
trial court, although Chapmans have argued those rights in their Brief on appeal.5 Months after
the hearing on Commonwealth's summary judgment motion, and after the trial court had
dismissed the Chapmans' complaint against Commonwealth, Commonwealth filed a Demand
for Arbitration with the AAA, as is its right under section 14 of the Conditions and Stipulations,
for a determination of the Chapmans' loss claim. At that point in time, i.e., May 2001,
Commonwealth had been dismissed out of the lawsuit on summary judgment, and Chapmans
had not sought leave to amend their complaint to bring Commonwealth back in as a defendant
5

At the hearing on summary judgment, the Court mentioned that the loss claim might
be determined through arbitration, but specifically noted that it was not ruling on that issue.
(R1150,pp.67-68).
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for a determination of the loss claim. Chapmans now argue on appeal that Commonwealth had
waived its right to arbitration. But since the loss claim was never raised as an issue in the
lawsuit, Commonwealth's right to arbitrate the loss claim was never raised. Accordingly, the
issue is not properly before this Court. See Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management,
645 P.2d 667,672 (Utah 1982) (appellate court "will not consider on appeal issues which were
not submitted to the trial court and concerning which the trial court did not have the opportunity
to make any findings of fact or law").
Nor is Chapmans' argument regarding waiver correct. The standard in Utah for determining whether a party has waived a contractual right of arbitration is two-pronged - a participation in litigation inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate, and a finding of prejudice. Chandler
v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356,360 (Utah 1992). These are factual questions,
and the party who claims waiver has the burden of establishing the facts. Id. at 359. The only
contract claim for which Chapmans sued Commonwealth was an alleged breach of contract for
its failure to defend Chapmans' title. But the amount of Chapmans' loss under the title policy
was never at issue in the litigation. That issue remains a live one between the parties, outside
of the litigation, and separate from the legal issue that the trial court determined on summary
judgment, i.e., that Commonwealth was not obligated under the contract to defend Chapmans'
title. Commonwealth's participation in the litigation was not inconsistent with its right to
arbitrate the amount of loss that Chapmans suffered. Chapmans have failed to meet the first
prong of the test.
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The second prong of the test requires Chapmans to establish prejudice. As the party
claiming waiver, Chapmans must establish prejudice that "relate[s] to the delay in the assertion
of the right to arbitrate, and . . . [is] of such a nature that the party opposing arbitration suffers
some real harm...." Id. at 360. In their Brief, Chapmans do not offer any claim of prejudice at
all. Without such proof, their waiver argument must be rejected outright.
With regard to Chapman's argument on Rule 8(c) U.R.Civ.P., the rule only requires a
party to raise in his answer all affirmative defenses that he has to claims that the plaintiff
actually raises in his complaint. The only contract claim Chapmans made in the trail court was
that Commonwealth was obligated to defend their title. Chapmans did not raise their loss claim,
and Commonwealth was not obliged under Rule 8(c) to raise the arbitration clause as an
affirmative defense.
The parties' rights to arbitration under the title policy never having been raised as an
issue in the trial court, they are not properly before this Court on appeal.
ISSUE 4 -

COMMONWEALTH AND BASIN ARE NOT LIABLE IN TORT TO
CHAPMANS. BUT ARE ONLY RESPONSIBLE TO COMPENSATE
THEM FOR THE LOSS OCCASIONED BY THE DEFECT IN THEIR
TITLE,

It is established Utah law that title insurance agents cannot be liable to an insured simply
because the commitment or policy contains an error in reflecting the title. Culp Construction
Co. v. Buildmart Mall, 795 P.2d 650,653 (Utah 1990). Only in instances where a title insurance
agent specifically assumes responsibilities of an abstractor can the title insurance agent be liable
in negligence to its insured. Id. at 655. In this case, Basin did not assume any such
18

responsibilities, nor was it asked to do so by the Chapmans. The trial court did not err in
determining that Basin was not liable in negligence for failing to discover that the road across
the Chapmans' property was a county road.6
A.

THE UTAH SUPREME COURT HAS SQUARELY HELD THAT A TITLE
INSURANCE COMPANY CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE IN TORT FOR
MISTAKES IN REPORTING TITLE.

Commitments for title insurance are simply statements of terms and conditions under
which an insurer is willing to issue its title policy. Culp, 795 P.2d at 653. While Chapmans
urge, without citation, that "a title insurer is hired by the insured to render a report of recorded
documents," (Chapman's Brief, p. 18), the Utah Supreme Court disagrees:
One who hires a title insurance company does so for the purpose of obtaining the
assurance or guarantee of obtaining a certain position in the chain of title rather
than for the purpose of discovering the title status. A title insurance company's
function is generally confined to the practice of insurance, not to the practice of
abstracting.
Culpy 795 P.2d at 654. The Culp Court went on to explain that an abstract of title is "[a]
condensed history of the title to the land," reporting the material recorded conveyances or any
other estate or interests therein. Id. Under Utah law, a title insurer has no duty to abstract title
for its customers. Thus, contrary to Chapmans' position, Basin had no duty to render them a
report of recorded documents.

6

Chapmans' claim against Commonwealth for negligence was based on principles of
vicarious liability. That claim was dismissed when the trial court dismissed the negligence
claim against Basin, and Chapmans have not appealed that ruling. Accordingly, this Briefs
discussion of the negligence claim will refer to only Basin, although the arguments are
equally applicable to Commonwealth.
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String-citing cases from other jurisdictions, the Chapmans argue that a title insurer can
be sued for professional negligence or malpractice in many states. The Chapmans even cite to
Culp, apparently misunderstanding, or perhaps ignoring the holdings ofthe Utah Supreme Court
in that case. The Culp Court specifically rejected this notion, first examining the concept
established in other states, and then spurning it in favor of the prevailing view that a title insurer
is not liable in tort simply for making mistakes in reporting title to its customer. Culp at 653.7
The prevailing view is explained at some length by the California Court of Appeals in a case
on which the Culp Court relied:
Title insurance is a contract for indemnity under which the insurer is obligated to
indemnify the insured against losses sustained in the event that a specific contingency,
e.g., the discovery of a lien or encumbrance affecting title, occurs. [Citations omitted].
The policy of title insurance, however, does not constitute a representation that the
contingency insured against will not occur. [Citations omitted]. Accordingly, when such
contingency occurs, no action for negligence or negligent misrepresentation will lie

Chapmans seem to attempt to distinguish Culp by asserting that the case differentiates
between the title policy and the commitment. (Chapman's Brief, p. 16, fh 2). But any
attempt to step outside the principles ofCulp on the basis of the fact that the final policy that
Basin issued contained the same statements as the commitment is unavailing. Culp did
address a commitment for title insurance, and not the policy itself. But the Culp Court cited
to many cases where the courts were examining preliminary reports as well as the final
policies. Lawrence v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 192 Cal. App. 3d 70, 76 (Cal. App. 1987)
(holding that liability for negligence under both preliminary report and policy not
supportable); Brown's Tie & Lumber v. Chicago Title Co. of Idaho, 764 P.2d 423,425 (Idaho
1988) (interpreting Anderson v. Title Ins. Co., 655 P.2d 82 (Idaho 1982) and holding that
contract for title insurance and policy is source of duty between parties, not negligence
principles); Horn v. Lawyers Title Ins. Co., 557 P.2d 206,208 (N.M. 1976) (holding that any
duty on part of title company to search records comes from policy); Walker Rogge, Inc. v.
Chelsea Title & Guaranty Co., 562 A.2d 208, 219 (N.J. 1989) (discussing prevailing view
of no tort liability for title companies and examining cases involving both commitments and
policies). Given Culp's recognition that title insurers are not abstractors, there is no rational
differentiation between the commitment for insurance and the policy itself.
20

against the insurer based upon the policy of title insurance alone. [Citations omitted] 2
Miller and Starr, Current Law of California Real Estate, supra, summarizes governing
law: ff[T]he insurer does not represent expressly or impliedly that the title is as set forth
in the policy; it merely agrees that, and the insured only expects that, the insurer will pay
for any losses resulting from, or he will cause the removal of, a cloud on the insured's
title within the policy provisions." (Id., at § 12.79, pp. 385-386.) The treatise further
notes: "A title policy is not a summary of the public records and the insurer is not
supplying information; to the contrary he is giving a contract of indemnity. A title
insurer, as any other insurer, can and does assume the risk of its policy. Every insurer can
and does contract to indemnify against specific risks...." (Id., at fn. 6, p. 385.)
Accordingly, when the contingency insured against under the policy occurs, the
title insurer is not, by that fact alone, liable to the insured for damages in contract or tort,
but rather, is obligated to indemnify the insured under the terms of the policy.
Lawrence v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 192 Cal.App.3d 70, 74-75 (1987), cited in Culp} 795 P.2d
at 653, fn. 4. While courts in other states may charge title insurers with negligence for making
mistakes in connection with the issuance of a title commitment or policy, Utah clearly does not.
B.

BASIN ASSUMED NO DUTIES OR RESPONSIBILITIES APART FROM
ISSUING THE TITLE COMMITMENT AND POLICY WHICH WOULD
EXPOSE IT TO ANY TORT LIABILITY.

While a title company is not absolutely immune from tort liability, such liability only
arises when the company assumes duties and responsibilities in addition to those undertaken in
connection with the issuance of a title commitment or policy. Culp is a good example of the
circumstances under which such liability is imposed. Other examples occur in the Utah cases
cited by Chapman, to wit, Wycalis v. Guardian Title, 780 P.2d 821 (Utah Ct.App. 1989), cert.
den. 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1990) and Christensen v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d
302 (Utah 1983). In each of these cases, the title company's liability for negligence was
predicated on acts other than the issuance of a title commitment or policy.
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In Culp, the insurer's agent received escrow instructions specifically directing the agent
not to transfer loan funds unless the title status remained the same as on the commitment. The
Culp Court held that the agent had undertaken a commitment beyond issuing the title insurance
policy, i.e., the obligation not to disburse funds unless the title remained as specified. Culp, 795
P.2dat655.
Similarly, in Christensen, the Plaintiffs claim for negligent misrepresentation arose out
of the title company providing misleading information in its assumed capacity as bookkeeper
for the landowner developer and its lender. Christensen, 666 P.2d at 306. There was no
question in the case about any title insurance policy or a commitment, or mistakes made in
preparing such documents. Instead, it was the title company's bookkeeping errors that formed
the basis for its tort liability.
Finally, in Wycalis, the title company, acting as trustee under the trust deed, had released
the plaintiff/beneficiary's interest in the trust deed on the basis of a forged request for
reconveyance. Wycalis, 780 P.2d at 823. The plaintiff accused the title company of negligence,
claiming that the standard of care owed by the title company to her required more than
unquestioning reliance on the forged request. Id. at 826. No question of the title company's
obligation to report title was even remotely involved.
In the instant matter, Basin assumed none of the types of duties and performed none of
the actions that formed the basis for liability in Culp, Christensen, or Wycalis, Here, after Basin
issued the commitment for the insurance policy, Chapmans' only discussions with Basin
involved water certificates and the addition of Roger Chapman to the commitment. (R621 (a):622

16). Although the commitment excepted from coverage the issue of the road status, Chapmans
never discussed the status of the road on the property with Basin, not when they hired Basin to
provide an insurance policy, nor after the commitment for insurance was issued. (R621:14-19;
R620:9-11). Chapmans did not request that Basin abstract the title nor investigate whether the
road was a public right-of-way. (R620:9-l 1). Chapmans did not provide any written instructions to Basin regarding escrow or closing or requesting that Basin assess the status of road or
abstract title of the property. (R621:20-22). Chapmans did not request, and therefore, Basin
did not assume additional responsibilities or duties beyond providing title insurance in
connection with closing on the property. As a result, under the precedent pronounced by the
Utah Supreme Court in Culp, Basin has no tort liability to Chapmans.
Selectively picking language from the policy and the commitment, Chapmans argue that
Basin assumed the duty of an abstractor by stating in those documents that "[the] Property is not
located on a county road...". But Chapmans may not discriminatorily choose only those words
which appear to help them. This language must be read in the context in which it was included,
which is as a policy exception listed on Schedule B-2. In context, the language is part of an
entire sentence, which reads:
This policy does not insure against loss or damage (and the Company will not pay costs,
attorney's fees or expenses) which arise by reason of: . . . 18. [The] Property is not
located on a county road and company DOES NOT INSURE ACCESS.
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(R4444, R443(a).8 This sentence does not guarantee or offer a legal conclusion that the road
running through the property is a private road, as Chapmans urge. What the sentence says is
that there is no insurance coverage that the property has access to a county road. While the
sentence may have been more artfully drafted, Chapmans offer no citations that would allow
them to recover in tort on the basis of a clause, read out of context, contained in an exception
in a title policy. If Chapmans' argument were to be accepted, the principles in Culp would have
to be rejected. A title commitment is no more than a statement of terms and conditions upon
which the insurer is willing to insure the title of the property. Culp, 795 P.2d at 653. The policy
itself is an agreement the insurer will pay for any losses resulting from, or it will cause the
removal of, a cloud on the insured's title within the policy provisions. Lawrence, 192
Cal.App.3d at 75. In context, the language to which Chapmans point is nothing more than a
statement by Basin that it would not and did not insure that the property had any access to a
county road. Under Culp, Basin cannot be held liable to the Chapmans for negligence.

The language in the commitment was practically identical:
Schedule B of the policy or policies to be issued will contain exceptions to the
following matters unless the same are disposed of to the satisfaction of the
company:... 18. Property is not located on a county road and company DOES
NOT INSURE ACCESS.
(R611,R613).
24

C.

BASIN HAS NO DUTY TO CHAPMANS UNDER U.C.A. §31A-20-110 (1)
TO PERFORM A TITLE ABSTRACT SEARCH.

Chapmans also fail to properly read Culp in arguing that U.C.A. §31 A-20-110(1) a title
insurer can be held liable for negligence for making mistakes in reporting title. Addressing this
very issue, the Utah Supreme Court in Culp specifically noted that:
[E]ven though section 31 A-20-110(1) imposes a duty of a reasonable search and
examination for the purpose of determining the insurability of title, it does not
impose a duty to abstract titles upon title insurance companies.
Culp, 795 P.2d at 654 (emphasis added). The statute states on its face that it "does not create,
eliminate, or modify any private cause of action or remedy." §31 A-20-110(3). The statute is
in the nature of a reporting requirement, mandating that insurers maintain the examination
materials for a period of time, and enforceable only by the insurance commissioner. §31A-20110(1) to (3). Thus, a title company must complete a search to protect itself as indemnitor
against losses covered by its policy and to satisfy reporting requirements established by the
insurance commissioner. But the section does not impose a duty on title insurers to provide an
abstract of title to a policy holder. Section 31 A-20-110(1) simply does not create a cause of
action against either Basin or Commonwealth.9
9

Absent any duty to correctly report all matters that might affect title, it is irrelevant
whether Basin's title search met industry standards. Thus, the trial court did not need to
address Chapmans' failure to introduce affidavits regarding the standard of care. However,
contrary to Chapmans' argument, it was not Basin's obligation to submit affidavits on
summary judgment to negate the claim of negligence. Relying on the undisputed facts and
on Culp, Basin set out a prima facie case that Chapman's negligence claim should be
dismissed on summary judgment. Having done so, the burden shifted to Chapmans to
provide opposing evidence on the essential elements of their claim, including the standard
(continued...)
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's court's grant of summary judgment,
dismissing the claims that Chapmans raised against Commonwealth and Basin, should be
affirmed.
DATED this J_T^day of September, 2002.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.

Richard A. Rappaport
Leslie Van Frank
Attorneys for Appellees Commonwealth Land
Title Insurance Company and Basin Land Title
& Abstract, Inc.

9

(...continued)
of care to be applied. See, Campbell, Maack & Sessions v. DeBry, 38 P.3d 984, 991, ffl|18,
20 and fn 7 (Utah App. 2001)("Under Rule 56(e), once the proponent of summary judgment
establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the opponent to provide some evidence
in opposition to the motion and in support of the essential elements of her claim."). Further,
Chapmans cite to no legal authority that would support their assertion that a self-imposed
standard of care is evidence of the standard of care for the title industry in general.
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APPENDIX 1

FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Breach of Title Insurance Contract)
48.

As and for their Fifth Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs Chapman adopt and incorporate all

allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1-26 hereof, as if the same were fully set forth herein.
49.

On or before July 16,1997, Plaintiffs Chapman applied through Defendant Basin Title

for a policy of title insurance from Defendant Commonwealth covering the real property forming the
subject matter of this action in Sec 31. T7S, R21E.
50.

On or about July 16,1997, Commonwealth issued Plaintiffs Chapman its Title Policy

No. 207-899161 ensuring Plaintiffs Chapman's title to the real property forming the subject matter
of this action declaring in Schedule B, Item 18 thereof: "Property is not located on a county road and
company DOES NOT INSURE ACCESS". A copy of the policy is attached as Exhibit 5.
51.

After notice from Defendant Uintah County regarding the claimed public right-of-way

over Plaintiffs property, Plaintiffs Chapman duly and properly made claim upon Defendant
Commonwealth to defend Plaintiffs Chapman against Uintah County's claim that Wyasket Bottom
Road was a county road.
52.

Despite such demand, Defendant Commonwealth failed, refused and neglected to

defend Plaintiffs Chapman's quiet use and enjoyment of the subject real property, thereby breaching
the contract of title insurance issued to Plaintiffs Chapman by Defendant Commonwealth.
53.

As and for their damages, Plaintiffs Chapman claim general and special damages in an

amount to be proven at trial, including, but not limited to, attorney's fees and costs of suit incurred
11
Appendix l

by Plaintiffs Chapman in defending their right to quiet use and enjoyment of the subject property.
SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
(Negligent Misrepresentation /Failure to Disclose)
54.

As and for their Sixth Claim for Relief, Plaintiffs Chapman adopt and incorporate all

allegations set forth in Paragraphs 1-26 and 49-51 as if the same were fully set forth here.
55.

The absence of a public right-of-way over the Chapman Property was a material

consideration to Plaintifls Chapman in purchasing the subject property located in Sec. 31, T7S, R2 IE.
56.

Defendant Basin Title undertook, as a professional abstractor for hire, to perform a

title search of all public records and documents relating to the Chapman Property.
57.

In performing its search of public records, Basin Title found or should have found in

the exercise of professional abstract activities, various documents recorded by Defendant Uintah
County asserting and declaring that the road over the Chapman Property was a "public highway" for
the use, benefit and right-of-way by the public ("County Declarations").
58.

Upon issuing a Commitment of Title Insurance to Plaintiffs Chapman, Defendant Basin

Title affirmatively represented to Plaintiffs Chapman that the road over the Chapman Property was
not a public road: to wit, Schedule B, Item 18, of Exhibit 5.
59.

Defendant Basin Title failed, refused and neglected to disclose to Plaintiffs Chapman

the existence of the County Declarations and further failed to disclose the claim by Defendant Uintah
County that the road over the Sec. 31 Property was a public right-of-way.
60.

Defendant Basin Title knew, or reasonably should have known, that its representations
12
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motion has merit, the trial court must so
advise the appellate court, and the moving
party may then request a remand. Ryan
v. United States Lines Co., 303 F.2d 430
(2d Cir.1962); Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 601 F.2d 39
(1st Cir.1979); Duriron Co. v. Bakke, 431
P.2d 499 (Alaska 1967); Life of the Land v.
Ariyoshi 553 P.2d 464 (Haw.1976). This
court has never been confronted with this
problem, prior to this case, although the
Utah Court of Appeals recently adopted
the second rule described above in Baker v.
Western Surety Co., 757 P.2d 878 (Utah
Ct.App.1988). We now do the same.

attorney fees and defendants' liability.
Under these circumstances, we see no need
to suspend our jurisdiction while the district court has the matter under consideration, as that will only delay proceedings.
Instead, the trial court should hear the rule
60(b) motion and may deny it without interference from this court. If the motion is
granted, the trial court in this case need
only advise this court that the judgment
has been modified. The district court action granting or denying the motion and
the modified judgment should be included
in the record when it is prepared for review
by this court.

This court has long followed the general
rule that the trial court is divested of jurisdiction over a case while it is under advisement on appeal.3 We have made exceptions to the rule, in the interest of preventing unnecessary delay, where any action by
the trial court is not likely to modify a
party's rights with respect to the issues
raised on appeal. Thus in Peters v. Peters,
15 Utah 2d 413, 394 P.2d 71 (1964), we held
that the district court, which has continuing jurisdiction after entry of a final divorce decree, may adjudicate a petition to
modify the decree due to a change of circumstances while the decree is pending on
appeal since the petition for modification is
collateral to the divorce decree. Similarly,
where the trial court has, pursuant to Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), certified as
final a judgment against one party in a
multi-party action, the remainder of the
action remains in the trial court and is not
necessarily affected by the appeal. In that
case, the trial court has jurisdiction to proceed with the claims remaining unadjudicated. Lane v. Messer, 689 P.2d 1333
(Utah 1984).

Defendants' motion to stay proceedings
and remand the case to the district court is
denied, and the district court is directed to
hear and determine the rule 60(b) motion.

[4,5] In the instant case, defendants
seek to reduce the judgment against them
by amounts which they aver have already
been paid to plaintiff.4 An adjudication of
the motion, though a modification of the
judgment may result, will not affect the
legal issues raised here with respect to
3. See, e.g.t Smith v. Kimball 76 Utah 350, 289 P.
588 (1930).

CULP CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
and Federal Insurance
Company, Plaintiffs,
v.
BUILDMART MALL, a Utah limited
partnership, et al., Defendants.
TOWER FEDERAL SAVINGS AND
LOAN ASSOCIATION, Defendant,
Third-Party Plaintiff, and Appellant,
v.
LAWYERS TITLE INSURANCE CORPORATION, Defendant, Third-Party
Defendant, and Appellee.
No. 880388.
Supreme Court of Utah.
June 27, 1990.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 10, 1990.
Lender brought action against title insurer for breach of contract and negligent
4. We, of course, express no opinion on the merits of the motion, that being for the trial court to
determine.
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misrepresentation.
The Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Raymond S. Uno,
J., granted summary judgment for insurer,
and appeal was taken. The Supreme
Court, Hall, C.J., held that: (1) title insurer
was not abstractor of title, and (2) fact
issue existed as to whether insurer was
liable for negligent misrepresentation.
Remanded.
Howe, Associate C.J., concurred in result.

1. Appeal and Error <s>934(l)
On appeal from summary judgment,
reviewing court looks at facts in light most
favorable to party opposing summary judgment.
2. Abstracts of Title <£=>3
Title insurer did not breach contractual
duty of good faith and fair dealing, though
it allegedly failed to update commitment
for insurance to show existence of additional liens, where insurer fully and adequately
defended insured's lien position, as it was
obligated to do by terms of policy.
3. Abstracts of Title <®=>3
Title insurer could not be held liable in
tort for abstractor's error in commitment
for insurance; insurer owed insured no
duty to abstract title.
4. Torts <s=>3
Statutory requirements that give rise
to independent causes of action under various unfair practices acts may also give rise
to independent tort actions.
5. Action <s=»27(l)
Tort of negligent misrepresentation
could be asserted against title insurer separately from breach of contract claim,
though alleged misrepresentation arose out
of contractual relationship of parties.
6. Judgment <s=>181(23)
Issue of material fact as to whether
title insurer knew that it would be relying
on insurance commitment made to mortgage broker when making loan precluded

summary judgment for insurer in lender's
action for negligent misrepresentation.
John P. Ashton, Brian S. King, Salt Lake
City, and John A. Kincaid, Jr., John R.
O'Keefe, Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendant,
third-party plaintiff, and appellant.
Jeffrey R. Oritt, Robert S. Howell, Salt
Lake City, and Mark T. Davenport, Doug
T. Butler, Dallas, Tex., for defendant,
third-party defendant, and appellee.
HALL, Chief Justice:
Tower Federal Savings and Loan Association appeals from a grant of summary
judgment in favor of Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation. The trial court found
that no genuine issue of material fact existed with regard to Tower Federal Savings
and Loan Association's complaint that Lawyers Title Insurance Corporation owed
Tower Federal Savings and Loan a duty to
disclose all record title information. We
affirm in part and reverse in part.
FACTS
[1] On appeal from summary judgment,
we look at the facts in a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.1
In September 1983, Buildmart Mall, a
Utah limited partnership, was established
to develop and construct, in Salt Lake
County, a retail shopping mall and warehouse distribution center, specializing in
custom building materials. Funding for
the project was essentially generated from
the sale of industrial development revenue
bonds ("IRBs") in the face amount of
$7,750,000. First Security Bank of Utah,
N.A. ("First Security"), acted as indenture
trustee on the IRB loan through its corporate trust department. The deed of trust
securing the IRB loan was recorded on
September 26, 1984, in the Salt Lake County Recorder's office.
During the summer of 1984, the principal
of the project determined that a funding
shortfall of approximately $500,000 existed
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for the completion of the project. Towerr
Federal Savings and Loan Associationi
("Tower") was approached by a mortgages
broker, Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Cor-'poration ("Richards-Woodbury"), with re-spect to lending Buildmart Mall $750,000,,
secured by a second position deed of trustt
to the project, in order to complete construction.
Richards-Woodbury retained Lawyers5
Title Insurance Corporation ("Lawyers Title") to provide a commitment for title in-•
surance and issue a title insurance policy.
Richmond Title Company ("Richmond Ti-"
tle"), the local agent for Lawyers Title,y
furnished Richards-Woodbury with a com-*
mitment for title insurance that revealedI
certain encumbrances and liens against the5
title. Richmond Title also acted as local'
agent for Lawyers Title in writing the sub-"
sequent title policy.
On March 18, 1985, Jeffery K. Woodbury, acting as agent for Tower, wrote a1
letter to Richmond Title delineating escrow
instructions for the funds to be loaned by
Tower. Richmond Title was instructed,
among other things, to deposit the funds;
into an escrow account and to release the1
funds to Buildmart Mall only when Richmond Title had taken steps to "insure that
the Trust Deed enclosed herewith . . . is in
a second lien position behind [First Security
Bank]" and "[t]he only prior exceptions to
the Trust Deed should be those listed in
your Commitment for Title Insurance/' In
addition, the escrow instructions directed
Richmond that if it was "unable or unwilling to promptly follow all of the above
referenced instructions," it was to forego
disbursement of the funds.
Prior to the Tower loan's closing but
after the commitment for title insurance
("the commitment") had been issued, numerous liens appeared of record that were
not reported by Lawyers Title or Richmond
Title on the commitment. Richmond nevertheless disbursed the funds, and the Tower
loan was secured by a second deed of trust
that was recorded on March 20, 1985, in the
office of the Salt Lake County Recorder.
Sometime after March 20, 1985, the developer defaulted on its loan with Tower,

as well as its obligations under the IRB
loan.
Culp
Construction
Company
("Culp"), the developer's primary general
contractor, filed a complaint on September
3, 1985, naming Tower as one of the defendants. Tower tendered its defense of the
litigation to Lawyers Title under the terms
of the title insurance policy. Lawyers Title
accepted the tender of defense subject to a
reservation of rights.
First Security initiated nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings against the project as
trustee under the indenture of trust and,
on March 16, 1987, held a trustee's sale at
which First Security acquired the project.
As a result of the foreclosure proceedings,
all liens junior to the first lien held by First
Security, including the Tower trust deed,
were extinguished by operation of law.
Tower and its counsel did not take any
action to stop the foreclosure sale or protect its security interest.
A settlement was reached between all
parties, resulting in the dismissal of all
claims with prejudice, with the exception of
the claims between Tower and Lawyers
Title. All outstanding mechanics's liens on
the project were released as part of the
settlement.
On appeal from summary judgment in
favor of Lawyers Title, Tower asserts that
there are genuine issues of material fact
with respect to three causes of action:
breach of contract, breach of an implied
contractual obligation of good faith and
fair dealing, and negligent misrepresentation.
I. BREACH OF CONTRACT
Tower's first claim is that Lawyers Title
breached a contractual duty to accurately
report the status of the title at the time the
Tower loan was closed. The record reveals
that the only contractual privity Tower had
with Lawyers Title was the title insurance
policy issued to Tower by Lawyers Title
through its local agent, Richmond Title.
The essence of Tower's claim is that as
part of the title insurance process, Lawyers
Title issued a commitment for title insurance to Richards-Woodbury that was not
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updated and upon which Tower relied in
making the loan. Tower claims that certain mechanic's liens of record were not
included as an update to the commitment
and that additional liens would have indicated a "red flag" that the project was
underfunded, which would have caused
Tower to decline advancing any loan funds
to Buildmart.

Tower's second lien position as it was obligated to do by the terms of the title insurance policy. For that reason, Tower's
cause of action for breach of an implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing or the
duty to bargain in good faith is unsupported by the facts. Hence, we affirm the
conclusion of the trial court that no genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to breach of the contractual duty of
good faith and fair dealing.2

Lawyers Title presents three arguments
to support summary judgment on the
breach of contract issue. Its first argument is that the only contract it had with
Tower was the title insurance policy itself
and that it fulfilled all requirements of the
policy. Second, Lawyers Title argues that
the commitment for title insurance that
preceded the title policy was issued to Richards-Woodbury, not to Tower, and therefore no privity existed between Lawyers
Title and Tower with regard to the commitment. Third, Lawyers Title argues that a
commitment or preliminary title report is
not an abstract of title and that it should
not be held liable for the abstractor's negligence.

[3] As to whether a title insurance company is an abstractor of title, some jurisdictions hold title insurance companies to the
standard of liability generally associated
with abstractors. 3 However, we believe
that the better-reasoned approach is to consider preliminary title reports and commitments for title insurance as "no more than
a statement of the terms and conditions
upon which the insurer is willing to issue
its title policy
" 4 Indeed, "[t]he prevailing view remains not to impose liability
in tort on a title company." 5

[2] It is first to be observed that Lawyers Title fully and adequately defended

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301(82) (1986 &
Supp.1989) defines title insurance as

2. See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795,
798 (Utah 1985).

negligent examination of title where title report
was inaccurate on dimensions of property).

3. See, e.g., Moore v. Title Ins. Co. of Minnesota,
148 Ariz. 408, 411-12, 714 P.2d 1303, 1306-07
(Ct.App.1985) (title company can be held liable
in tort for its negligence when it holds itself out
as a searcher of titles and provides the information for the applicants to act upon); McLaughlin
v. Attorneys' Title Guaranty Fund, Inc., 61 111.
AppJd 911, 18 Ill.Dec. 891, 895, 378 N.E.2d 355,
359 (1978) (when a person seeks title insurance,
he expects to obtain a professional title search
legal opinion as to the condition of title and a
guarantee); Ford v. Guarantee Abstract & Title
Co., 220 Kan. 244, 553 P.2d 254, 264-66 (1976)
(where title insurance company held out to the
public and assumed to discharge the same
duties as an individual conveyancer or attorney); Dorr v. Mass. Title Ins. Co., 238 Mass. 490,
131 N.E. 191 (1921) (title insurance company
held to have acted not merely as a title insurer
but also as a paid agent in examining the title);
Heyd v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 218 Neb. 296, 354
N.W.2d 154, 158-59 (1984) (when rendering a
title report and issuing a policy, a title insurance
company assumes the two distinct duties of abstractor and title insurer); Sunset Holding Corp.
v. Home Title Ins. Co., 172 Misc. 759, 16 N.Y.
S.2d 273 (1939) (purchaser of realty was entitled
tn r^rnvpr against title insurance company for

4. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Chicago Title Ins. Co.,
192 Cal.App.3d 70, 237 Cal.Rptr. 264, 267 (Cai.
App.1987) (the California Supreme Court upheld
White v. Western Title Ins. Co., 40 Cal.3d 870,
221 Cal.Rptr. 509, 710 P.2d 309 (1986), which
applied abstractor liability to title insurance
companies, but court noted that cause of action
arose in the Lawrence case after California legislature had passed a law eliminating abstractor
liability for title insurance companies); see also
Brown's Tie & Lumber v. Chicago Title Co. of
Idaho, 115 Idaho 56, 59-60, 764 P.2d 423, 426-27
(1988) (upholding Anderson and stating that to
fall outside of the Anderson rule it must be
shown that abstractor duties were voluntarily
assumed); Anderson v. Title Ins. Co., 103 Idaho
875, 879, 655 P.2d 82, 86 (1982) (refused to
impose the liabilities of an abstractor upon a
title insurance company merely because it issued a preliminary title report); Horn v. Lawyers Title Ins. Co., 89 N.M. 709, 711, 557 P.2d
206, 208 (1976) (no duty of title insurance company to search records unless express or implied m the policy).
5.

Walker Rogge, Inc. v. Chelsea Title & Guaranty
Co., 116 N.J. 517, 562 A.2d 208, 219 (1989).
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the insuring, guaranteeing, or indemnifying of owners of real or personal property or the holders of liens or encumbrances on that property, or others interested in the property against loss or damage suffered by reason of liens or encumbrances upon, defects in, or the unmarketability of the title to the property,
or invalidity or unenforceability of any
liens or encumbrances on the property.
It is also to be observed that a duty is
imposed by statute upon title insurers to
make a reasonable search and examination
of title for the purpose of determining insurability.
Utah
Code
Ann.
§ 31A-20-110(l) (1986) states in part: "No
title insurance policy may be written until
the title insurer or its agent has conducted
a reasonable search and examination of the
title and has made a determination of insurability of title under sound underwriting
principles." Nevertheless, even though
section 31A-20-110(l) imposes a duty of a
reasonable search and examination for the
purpose of determining the insurability of
title, it does not impose a duty to abstract
titles upon title insurance companies.
"Abstractor" is not defined in the Utah
Code; however, "abstract of title" has been
defined as
[a] condensed history of the title to land,
consisting of a synopsis or summary of
the material or operative portion of all
the conveyances, of whatever kind or
nature, which in any manner affect said
land, or any estate or interest therein,
together with a statement of all liens,
charges, or liabilities to which the same
may be subject, and of which is in any
way material for purchasers to be apprised. An epitome of the record evidence of title, including maps, plats, and
other aids.6
The function, form, and character of a
title insurer is different from that of an
abstractor. One who hires a title insurance
company does so for the purpose of obtain6. Black's Law Dictionary 10 (5th ed. 1979).
7. 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).
8. Id. at 800.

ing the assurance or guarantee of obtaining a certain position in the chain of title
rather than for the purpose of discovering
the title status. A title insurance company's function is generally confined to the
practice of insurance, not to the practice of
abstracting. Hence, Lawyers Title did not
owe a duty to abstract the title by virtue of
its status as a title insurance company.
II. NEGLIGENT
MISREPRESENTATION
The next claim asserted by Tower is that
Lawyers Title, through its agent Richmond
Title, negligently misrepresented the state
of the title in the commitment for title
insurance. The trial court held that because "negligent misrepresentation" is a
tort claim, it could not be asserted separately from the breach of contract claim
when the alleged misrepresentation arose
out of the contractual relationship of the
parties according to our decision in Beck v.
Farmers Insurance Exchange.1
[4] In Beckf an insured brought an action against an insurer for a bad-faith refusal to settle a claim for insured motorist
benefits. The insured alleged breach of
contract, breach of implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, and intentional
infliction of emotional distress. With regard to the emotional distress tort claim,
we held that "in a first-party relationship
between an insurer and its insured, the
duties and obligations of the parties are
contractual rather than fiduciary. Without
more, a breach of those implied or express
duties can give rise only to a cause of
action in contract, not one in tort." 8 However, our holding in Beck does not preclude
the bringing of a tort claim independently
of a contract claim. In Beckf we specifically stated: "We recognize that in some
cases the acts constituting a breach of contract may also result in breaches of duty
that are independent of the contract and
may give rise to causes of action in tort." 9
9. Id. at 800, n. 3 (citing Samms v. Eccles, 11
Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961) (intentionally
causing severe emotional distress to others);
Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co., 265 Cal.App.2d 921,
71 Cal.Rptr. 764 (1968) (breach of a duty to
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Statutory requirements that give rise to
independent causes of action under various
unfair practices acts may also give rise to
independent tort actions.10
Negligent
misrepresentation
occurs
"[w]here one having a pecuniary interest in
a transaction, is in a superior position to
know material facts, and carelessly or negligently makes a false representation concerning them, expecting the other party to
rely and act thereon, and the other party
reasonably does so and suffers loss in that
transaction
" n Furthermore, "privity
of contract is not a necessary prerequisite
to liability." 12
[5,6] In the instant case, Tower asserts
a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation because Lawyers Title provided a
commitment for title insurance to Richards-Woodbury, a mortgage broker, with
the knowledge that Tower would rely upon
the commitment in making the loan. Genuine issues of material fact exist with regard
to whether Lawyers Title knew that Tower
would rely upon the commitment in making
the loan. Indications of reliance on the
commitment may arise from the fact that
the title insurance policy was issued to both
Richards-Woodbury and Tower. In addition, the escrow instructions given to Lawyers Title's agent by Tower's agent reveal
that the loan was contingent upon the status of the title remaining the same at the
time of closing as it was when the commitment was provided.
Lawyers Title argues that because a
commitment is not an abstract of title,
Tower could not reasonably rely upon it as
a comprehensive statement of the status of
the title. We have heretofore concluded
that the commitment for title insurance or
a preliminary title report in this case was
not an abstract of title; however, it appears that Lawyers Title's local agent,
bargain in good faith amounting to fraudulent
activity)).
10. See, e,g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-5-2.5 (Supp.
1989), 76-9-501 to -509 (1978), 76-10-706 to
-708 (1978), 76-10-710 (1978).
11. Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 18 Utah 2d 378,
381, 423 P.2d 659, 662 (1967); see also Price-

Richmond Title, may have assumed the
duties and responsibilities of an abstractor
when it received the escrow instructions
from Tower's agent which explicitly directed Richmond not to transfer the loan funds
unless the title status remained the same
as stated on the commitment.
We hold that summary judgment on the
issue of negligent misrepresentation was
inappropriate because our decision in Beck
does not preclude a separate independent
tort. In addition, material factual issues
remain as to whether Lawyers Title owed a
contractual duty to Tower to represent the
true status of the title upon receipt and
acceptance of the escrow instructions and
at all times thereafter when Lawyers Title
knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, of additional
mechanic's liens against the subject property. Should it be determined that Lawyers
Title owed Tower a duty of disclosure, other questions of material fact also exist,
including whether that duty was breached
and whether Tower reasonably relied upon
the commitment, thereby defeating a motion for summary judgment.
Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., and
JUDITH M. BILLINGS, Court of
Appeals Judge, concur.
HOWE, Associate C.J., concurs in the
result.
DURHAM, J., having disqualified
herself, does not participate herein;
BILLINGS, Court of Appeals Judge, sat.

Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnel!, 713 P.2d 55, 59 (Utah 1986); Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 552 (1965).
12. Price-Orem, 713 P.2d at 59; Christenson v.
Commonwealth Land Title Ins, Co., 666 P.2d
302, 307 (Utah 1983).

